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Abstract—Until recently, deep steganalyzers in spatial domain
have been all designed for gray-scale images. In this paper, we
propose WISERNet (the wider separate-then-reunion network)
for steganalysis of color images. We provide theoretical rationale
to claim that the summation in normal convolution is one sort
of “linear collusion attack” which reserves strong correlated pat-
terns while impairs uncorrelated noises. Therefore in the bottom
convolutional layer which aims at suppressing correlated image
contents, we adopt separate channel-wise convolution without
summation instead. Conversely, in the upper convolutional layers
we believe that the summation in normal convolution is beneficial.
Therefore we adopt united normal convolution in those layers and
make them remarkably wider to reinforce the effect of “linear
collusion attack”. As a result, our proposed wide-and-shallow,
separate-then-reunion network structure is specifically suitable
for color image steganalysis. We have conducted extensive exper-
iments on color image datasets generated from BOSSBase raw
images and another large-scale dataset which contains 100,000
raw images, with different demosaicking algorithms and down-
sampling algorithms. The experimental results show that our
proposed network outperforms other state-of-the-art color image
steganalytic models either hand-crafted or learned using deep
networks in the literature by a clear margin. Specifically, it is
noted that the detection performance gain is achieved with less
than half the complexity compared to the most advanced deep-
learning steganalyzer as far as we know, which is scarce in the
literature.
Index Terms—steganalysis, steganography, deep learning, con-
volutional neural network.
I. Introduction
IN the last decade, the main battleground of spatial imageinformation hiding is at gray-scale cover images. However,
the confrontation between color image steganography and
its rival, color image steganalysis has drawn ever greater
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attentions of researchers due to the fact that the vast majority
of digital images in real life have colors.
Most of the modern gray-scale steganographic algorithms
including famed SUNIWARD [1], HILL [2] and MiPOD [3]
adopt the so-called additive embedding distortion minimizing
framework [4]. Move a step further, Denemark et al. [5]
and Li et al. [6] (named CMD steganography) independently
constructed an effective approach to preserve the correla-
tion between neighboring pixels. Generally, gray-scale image
steganographic algorithms, such as SUNIWARD and HILL
can be directly used for color images, by treating every color
band 1 as a gray-scale image and embedding secret bits into
the bands independently. There has been no steganographic
algorithms aiming at color images until recently. In 2016, in-
spired by CMD steganography, Tang et al. proposed a so-called
CMD-C steganography [7] purposely for color images. CMD-
C can preserve not only the correlation within each color band,
but also the correlation among three color bands. Therefore it
can better resist steganalysis targeted for color images. We
denote the CMD-C steganography using SUNIWARD [1] and
HILL [2] for initialization as CMD-C-SUNIWARD and CMD-
C-HILL, respectively. 2
The current dominant universal/blind gray-scale stegana-
lytic detectors use rich models with tens of thousands of
features [8], [9], and an ensemble classifier [10]. Rich models
for color image steganalysis had been proposed even before
specialized color steganography arose. In 2014, Goljan et
al. proposed the first color rich-model steganalytic features
set (CRM) [11]. Since most of the digital color images are
captured by cameras with one single sensor plus a Color Filter
Array (CFA), the CFA demosaicking algorithm used in the
generation procedure introduces constraints on the relationship
between neighboring color pixels, which can be utilized in
steganalysis. In [12], Goljan et al. proposed a CFA-aware rich
model for color image steganalysis. In [13], Abdulrahman et
al. proposed another CFA-aware rich model. Further on, they
fused CRM with features extracted from inter-band geometric
transformation measures (GCRM) [14], and features based on
steerable Gaussian filters bank (SGRM) [15]. However, the
applicability of the features proposed in [12]–[15] remains
limited due to the fact that varying post-processing procedures,
1In the literature, the red/greeen/blue channels in true-color images are also
called “color bands”. Throughout the paper, we adopt the term “color bands”
to avoid confusion with the term “channels” in deep-learning architectures.
2Throughout this paper, the acronyms used for the steganographic and
steganalytic algorithms are taken from the original papers. The corresponding
full names are omitted for brevity.
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2e.g. down-sampling and rotating, tend to severely weaken CFA
related correlations.
Characteristics of the specific attacking targets [16], [17]
and the specific cover sources [18] can be utilized to further
improve detection performance of rich models. But, utilizing
the knowledge of attacking targets might violate the purpose of
universal/blind steganalysis, while utilizing the characteristics
of specific cover sources might lead to over-optimized detec-
tors. Therefore in our work we adhere to generic universal
steganalysis with neither the knowledge of specific stegano-
graphic algorithms (e.g. content-adaptive) nor the knowledge
of specific cover sources.
In recent years, deep-learning networks have achieved over-
whelming superiority over conventional approaches in many
fields [19]. Researchers in image steganalysis have also tried
to investigate the potential of deep-learning networks in this
field. Started from the pioneer work of Tan and Li [20],
researchers have kept trying to promote detection perfor-
mance of deep-learning steganalyzers [21]–[23]. In 2016,
Xu et al. proposed a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
structure for image steganalysis which outperforms hand-
crafted steganalytic features [24] (referred as Xu’s model
#1). In the following years, the literature witnessed deep-
learning steganalyzers going deeper and more complicated.
Ye et al. proposed a deeper CNN equipped with a new
activation function (TLU) which can further boost detection
performance [25] (referred as Ye’s model). In JPEG domain,
Zeng et al. proposed a hybrid CNN steganalyzers equipped
with quantization and truncation, which is obviously superior
to hand-crafted JPEG steganalytic features [26], [27]. Chen et
al. proposed a JPEG-phase-aware deep CNN steganalyzer [28].
Inspired by ResNet [29], Xu proposed a much deeper CNN
based JPEG steganalyzer [30] (referred as Xu’s model #2).
However, all of the above deep-learning steganalyzers are
gray-scale image oriented. According to our best knowledge,
there is no report to address deep-learning based color image
steganalysis.
In this paper, we propose WISERNet, a specific wider
separate-then-reunion network for steganalysis of color im-
ages. We claim that the summation in normal convolution is
one sort of “linear collusion attack” which is the process of
forming a linear combination of input bands [31]. It reserves
strong correlated patterns while impairs uncorrelated noises.
Since the main purpose of the convolutions in the bottom
convolutional layer is to suppress correlated image contents,
for the bottom convolutional layer we discard summation and
introduce channel-wise convolution. On the other hand, in the
upper convolutional layers we still adopt normal convolution
which retains summation and make them remarkably wider, in
order to reinforce the effect of “linear collusion attack”. This
is because we believe such an upper structure is beneficial
to the ability of CFA related “hidden-pattern-aware”. We
have conducted extensive experiments on color image datasets
generated from public true-color raw images as well as a
large-scale dataset which contains 100,000 raw images. The
results demonstrated the superiority of our proposed network
over other state-of-the-art steganalyzers either hand-crafted or
learned using deep networks in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II,
we firstly show the theoretical rationale of our proposed
WISERNet, and then describe the detailed structure of WIS-
ERNet. Results of experiments conducted on different color
image datasets are presented in Sect. III. Finally, we make
conclusions in Sect. IV.
II. Our proposed WISERNet
In this section, we firstly introduce convolutional layers, the
principal part of CNN as preliminaries. Then we discuss the
motivation of our proposed WISERNet in theory. Finally we
provide the conceptual architecture of WISERNet, as well as
its detailed configuration.
A. Preliminaries
In this paper we only consider RGB true-color model. Given
X, a true-color image of size of M × N, it comprises three
bands, namely the red, the green, and the blue band. In our
research, we do not take the specific characteristic of a band
into consideration. Therefore without loss of generality, X can
be represented as {X1,X2,X3}, where Xi = (xi,pq)M×N , xi,pq ∈
{0, 1, · · · , 255}, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, 1 ≤ p ≤ M and 1 ≤ q ≤ N. All
of the state-of-the-art steganographic algorithms which can be
applied on color images ([1], [2], [5]–[7]) add zero-mean ±1
additional stego noise to every target band of a given cover
image. Therefore, every band in X can be further represented
as Xi = (ci,pq + ni,pq)M×N = Ci + Ni, where Ci = (ci,pq)M×N ,
ci,pq ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 255} denotes the corresponding cover band,
and Ni = (ni,pq)M×N , ni,pq ∈ {−1, 0,+1} denotes the additive
stego noise matrix added to Xi. For an innocent cover image,
Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 are all zero matrices.
All of the state-of-the-art deep-learning steganalyzers [20]–
[28], [30] are based on CNN (Convolutional Neural Network).
The principal part of CNN is a cascade of alternating con-
volutional layers, regulation layers (e.g. BN layers [32]) and
pooling layers. On top of the principal part, there are optional
multiple fully-connected layers. Convolutional layers are the
core building blocks of a CNN. For a given convolutional layer
Ll, it takes J channels of inputs Zl−1j , 1 ≤ j ≤ J, convolves
them with an array of J×K kernels Wljk (usually with learnable
weights) and generates K channels of outputs Zlk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
In the context of image steganalysis, Zl−1j , Z
l
k, and W
l
jk are
always represented as two-dimensional matrices. The normal
convolution can be modeled as:
Zlk =
J∑
j=1
Zl−1j ∗Wljk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K (1)
We utilize channel-wise convolution, a variant of normal
convolution in our work. In channel-wise convolution, each
input channel corresponds to standalone K output channels
and is convolved with an array of K kernels. As a result with
J input channels we can get J × K output channels:
Zlk′ = Z
l−1
j ∗Wljk,
k′ = ( j − 1) × K + k, 1 ≤ j ≤ J, 1 ≤ k ≤ K (2)
3TABLE I
Means of the absolute value of the correlation between the intensity values
of different color bands versus those of the corresponding stego noises. The
results on BOSS-PPG-LAN for HILL, CMD-C-HILL, SUNIWARD, and
CMD-C-SUNIWARD with 0.4 bpc payload are reported.
Elements
red band
vs.
green band
red band
vs.
blue band
blue band
vs.
green band
For HILL steganography
Intensity values 0.9317 0.8297 0.9217
Stego noises 0.0024 0.0023 0.0024
For CMD-C-HILL steganography
Intensity values 0.9317 0.8297 0.9217
Stego noises 0.2704 0.2619 0.2859
For SUNIWARD steganography
Intensity values 0.9317 0.8297 0.9217
Stego noises 0.0022 0.0021 0.0022
For CMD-C-SUNIWARD steganography
Intensity values 0.9317 0.8297 0.9217
Stego noises 0.2980 0.2817 0.2975
The existing deep-learning steganalyzers [20]–[28], [30]
incorporate the domain knowledge behind rich models, and
initialize the kernels in the bottom convolutional layer as high-
pass filters to increase SNR (Signal-to-Noise Ratio) 3. Fixed
weights in the bottom kernels are adopted in most existing
deep-learning steganalyzers [20]–[24], [26]–[28], [30], while
learnable weights are adopted in Ye’s model [25].
B. Rationale of our proposed WISERNet
If we apply normal convolution with K output channels to
a true-color image in the bottom convolutional layer, we get:
Z1k =
3∑
j=1
X j ∗W1jk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
=
3∑
j=1
C j ∗W1jk +
3∑
j=1
N j ∗W1jk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K (3)
Our rationale starts from the following statement about
existing steganographic algorithms for color images:
For a true-color stego image, the intensity values in the same
location of the three bands exhibit strong correlation. Their
means (or expectations) are similar from the perspective of
statistics. Conversely, for steganographic algorithms originally
oriented to gray-scale images, e.g. [1]–[3], [5], [6], the zero-
mean ±1 additional stego noises in the same location of the
three bands exhibit no correlation. Even for [7] which is com-
mitted to increase the correlation of the stego noises among
bands, they still exhibit weak correlation. This is because
the well-established rate-distortion bound [33] determines that
strong correlation among stego noises and minimal possible
distortion are in conflict.
3In the literature of steganalysis, image content is “noise” while stego noise
is “signal”.
To verify the above statement, we analyzed the 10, 000
BOSS-PPG-LAN (see Sect. III-A) stego images gener-
ated by HILL, CMD-C-HILL, SUNIWARD, and CMD-C-
SUNIWARD, respectively, all with 0.4 bpc (bits per chan-
nel/band pixel) embedding rate. In the experiment, means of
the absolute value of the correlation between the intensity
values of different color bands were calculated. We compared
them with those of the corresponding stego noises. From
Tab. I, we can see that for all of the four steganographic
algorithms, stego noises have no effect on the correlation of
the intensity values among bands. They all exhibited notably
strong correlation. On the other hand, for HILL and SUNI-
WARD, the stego noises among bands exhibit nearly zero cor-
relation. Even for CMD-C-HILL and CMD-C-SUNIWARD,
they exhibit weak correlation.
As mentioned in Sect. II-A, the main purpose of the con-
volutions in the bottom convolutional layer is to boost SNR,
namely suppress image contents (intensity values) and retain
stego noises at the same time. Let E([•]) and Var([•]) denote
the expectation and the variance of the elements in matrix
[•]; Corr([•], []) denotes the correlation of the corresponding
elements in matrix [•] and []. Following the convention
in image processing [34], we define SNR of a given two-
dimensional input [•] as:
SNR([•]) = Var([•])
E2([•]) (4)
According to the linearity of expectation and (3), for a given
Z1k we can get:
SNR(Z1k) =
Var(
∑3
j=1 N j ∗W1jk)
E2(
∑3
j=1 C j ∗W1jk)
=
Var(
∑3
j=1 N j ∗W1jk)
(
∑3
j=1 E(C j ∗W1jk))2
(5)
Initially, we set W11k = W
1
2k = W
1
3k = W˜k, where W˜k is a
predefined high-pass filter. Since E(C1) ≈ E(C2) ≈ E(C3), we
can get E(C1 ∗W11k) ≈ E(C2 ∗W12k) ≈ E(C3 ∗W13k) = µ (as
demonstrated later in Tab. XI of Sect. III-D, the assumption
still holds along with increasing training iterations of WISER-
Net). Denote Var(N j ∗W1jk) = σ2j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 3. Existing color
image steganography tends to uniformly distribute embedding
changes to three color bands, therefore for the sake of sim-
plicity, we further assume that σ j = σ, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3. From (5)
we can get:
SNR(Z1k) =
∑3
j=1 Var(N j ∗W1jk) + ∆
9µ2
=
∑3
j=1 σ
2
j + ∆
9µ2
(6)
in which:
∆ = 2 ·
∑
1≤i< j≤3
Corr(Ni ∗W1ik,N j ∗W1jk) · σiσ j (7)
Please note that a discrete convolution is a linear transform,
and a linear transform will never change the correlation
between random variables [35]. Therefore:
Corr(Ni ∗W1ik,N j ∗W1jk) = Corr(Ni,N j), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3 (8)
4TABLE II
Impact of growing ρr-g = ρr-b = ρ on
MMDc
MMDn
.
ρr-g = ρr-b = ρ
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1.178 1.158 1.124 1.108 1.064 1.038 1.027 1.021 1.013 1.008 1.000
From (7) and (8) we can set ∆ = 0 for HILL and SUNI-
WARD since the inter-band correlation of the stego noises
generated by them is nearly zero. As a result:
SNR(Z1k) =
∑3
j=1 σ
2
j
9µ2
=
1
3
· σ
2
µ2
(9)
For CMD-C, ∆ is unneglectable. However, the inter-band
correlation of the stego noises stays weak. Using the statistics
reported in Tab. I, we set Corr(Ni,N j) ≈ 0.3, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3.
From (6) we can get:
SNR(Z1k) ≈
3σ2 + 2 · 3 · 0.3 · σ2
9µ2
=
5
9
· σ
2
µ2
(10)
Please note that:
SNR(X j ∗W1jk) =
Var(N j ∗W1jk)
E2(C j ∗W1jk)
=
σ2
µ2
, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 (11)
Compare (9), (10) with (11), we can see for those stegano-
graphic algorithms applied on color images, SNR(Z1k) <
SNR(X j ∗W1jk), 1 ≤ j ≤ 3. The summation in Z1k actually
impairs the SNR which has been boosted by the convolutions
in X j∗W1jk, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3. In fact, we can regard the summation in
normal convolution one sort of “linear collusion attack” [31]
which is the process of forming a linear combination of input
bands, and as a result can reserves strong correlated patterns,
while impairs uncorrelated noises (or weak correlated signals)
in input bands. Accordingly, we decide not to apply normal
convolution in the bottom convolutional layer.
In practice, there are three solutions to bypass the summa-
tion in normal convolution. The first solution is to directly
concatenate the three bands of X to generate a one-band input
X′ for the bottom convolutional layer, which is straightfor-
ward:
X′ = (x
′
pq′ )
M×3N ,
x
′
pq′ = xi,pq, q
′ = (i − 1) × N + q,
1 ≤ i ≤ 3, 1 ≤ p ≤ M, 1 ≤ q ≤ N (12)
The second solution is to interleave the intensity
values from three bands, e.g. in a fashion that
(x1,pq, x2,pq, x3,pq, x1,(p+1)q, x2,(p+1)q, x3,(p+1)q, · · · ).
The third solution is channel-wise convolution. We adopt
channel-wise convolution in our proposed network since we
believe the first two solutions are inferior to the third solution.
The argument is as follows.
Given (x1,pq, x2,pq, x3,pq), three intensity values in the same
location of the three color bands. We have already known
that they exhibit strong correlation. If we adopt the first solu-
tion, a.k.a. the straightforward solution, then (x1,pq, x2,pq, x3,pq)
corresponds to (x
′
pq, x
′
p(N+q), x
′
p(2N+q)) in X
′. Please note that
the column distance of (x
′
pq, x
′
p(N+q), x
′
p(2N+q)) is N, far beyond
the usual perception field of the kernels in lower convolu-
tional layers. As a result, the originally strong correlation in
(x1,pq, x2,pq, x3,pq), after mapped to (x
′
pq, x
′
p(N+q), x
′
p(2N+q)), can-
not be catched in lower convolutional layers. Only convolution
kernels in the top layers of very deep networks can perceive
it. The second solution is also infeasible. You can think of it
as a noisy up-sampling procedure of a given band in which
the step size is two. Those weak ±1 stego noises will be
by large concealed under the relatively more powerful up-
sampling noises.
On the other hand, if we adopt channel-wise convo-
lution, then after convolution, those elements affected by
(x1,pq, x2,pq, x3,pq) are still allocated at the corresponding lo-
cations of the output channels. The strong correlation in them
is thus kept, and can be perceived by all of the convolutional
layers from bottom to top.
In order to verify that the bottom channel-wise convolu-
tional layer do help to preserve stego noises and consequently
boost the SNR, we conducted an evaluation experiment as
follows:
Firstly, 40% pixels of every band of every cover image in
a dataset used in our experiments (BOSS-PPG-LAN, please
refer to Sect. III-A) are stochastically selected to perform
random ±1 modifications. The modifications simulate the
effect of naı¨ve LSB matching embedding. Then we apply
normal convolution or channel-wise convolution to the cover
images and their corresponding pseudo-stego images. Only
K5, one of the 30 spatial-domain rich model kernels [8],
is used in the convolution to further reduce the complex-
ity. With K5, whether normal convolution or channel-wise
convolution generates a single output feature map. Next, we
extract the 686-dimensional SPAM (Subtractive Pixel Adja-
cency Matrix) [36] steganalytic feature vector for every output
feature map. Finally, we compute the MMD (Maximum Mean
Discrepancy) [37] between the cover images and the corre-
sponding pseudo-stego images in the SPAM feature space. The
presence of a higher MMD value indicates that it is easier to
distinguish stego images from cover images.
Please note that a given stego image can be considered
to be a noisy version of the corresponding cover image, and
K5 is a high-pass filter aims at boosting the SNR. Therefore
with the same K5 kernel, the convolution type with relatively
higher MMD value helps to preserve stego noises. Let MMDn
and MMDc denotes the MMD value for the output feature
maps generated by normal convolution and channel-wise con-
volution, respectively. We can get MMDn = 0.01187 while
MMDc = 0.01398. As a result MMDcMMDn = 1.178, which implies
551
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Fig. 1. Conceptual architecture of our proposed WISERNet.
that the bottom channel-wise convolutional layer do help to
preserve stego noises and consequently boost SNR when stego
noises in separate color bands exhibit no correlation.
Furthermore, we investigate the impact of growing correla-
tion of stego noises in different bands on MMDcMMDn . For every
cover image, we firstly stochastically select 40% pixels of
the red band to perform random ±1 modifications. Let ρr-g
denotes the correlation of the ±1 modifications in the red
band and those in the green band. Analogically, The meaning
of ρr-b and ρg-b are self-evident. The ±1 modifications are
performed on the green band and the blue band, to guarantee
that ρr-g = ρr-b = ρ, 0 < ρ ≤ 1. It is easy to verify that
2ρ2 − 1 ≤ ρg-b ≤ 1 with ρr-g = ρr-b = ρ, and ρg-b → 1 along
with ρ → 1. Therefore as a compromise, we only investigate
the impact of growing ρr-g = ρr-b = ρ on MMDcMMDn . As shown in
Tab. II, MMDcMMDn keeps reducing along with increasing ρ, which
implies that the gain introduced by channel-wise convolution
gradually decreases with increasing inter-band correlation of
stego noises. However, since even for the state-of-the-art
steganographic algorithms (e.g. CMD-C) taking into account
the correlation of stego noises among bands, the inter-band
correlation of stego noises still keeps weak (is approximately
equal to 0.3, as shown in Tab. I). Therefore even for those
algorithms like CMD-C, the gain introduced by channel-wise
convolution still cannot be neglected.
We decide to only adopt channel-wise convolution and
withdraw summation in the bottom convolutional layer. In the
upper convolutional layers we still adopt normal convolution
which retains summation. This is because withdrawal of the
summation in convolution is a double-edged sword. Please
note that during the generation procedure of true-color images,
various kinds of sources, especially the CFA interpolation
algorithm, introduces dependencies among pixels and bands.
The dependencies can be regarded as hidden patterns stay
approximately the same in color bands. Though those hid-
den patterns are severely weaken in varying post-processing
procedures, it is still potential to be catched by deep-learning
networks. In a CNN based deep-learning network, since we
have already known discrete convolution will never change the
correlation between input channels, for a given convolutional
layer Ll we can also get:
Corr(Zl−1i ∗Wlik,Zl−1j ∗Wljk) = Corr(Zl−1i ,Zl−1j ) (13)
Therefore if we model the hidden patterns a certain sort of
correlation among bands, it can be passed forward through
the convolutional layers from bottom to top, even though
disturbed by the nonlinearities in the pipeline. Since every
normal convolutional layer can regarded as one sort of “linear
collusion attack”, the summations in cascaded convolutional
layers may enhance the ability of “hidden-pattern-aware” of
our proposed network. Therefore only in the bottom con-
volutional layer, which aims at suppressing contents while
retaining stego noises, we withdraw summation and adopt
channel-wise convolution.
6It has been verified that in “linear collusion attack”, the
more the objects involved in collusion, the better the strong
correlated patterns are reserved, the worse the weak correlated
signals are impaired [31]. Since we regard the summation in
normal convolution as one sort of “linear collusion attack”, it is
clear that the more the kernels in a given normal convolutional
layer, the more the outputs can be involved in summation, and
therefore the better results of the “linear collusion attack” we
can expect. Based on the above analysis, our design concept
is different from typically making the deep-learning network
deeper. We try to promote the performance of our proposed
steganalyzer by making the upper convolutional layers wider,
namely expanding the number of their convolution kernels.
C. WISERNet: the wider separate-then-reunion network
In light of the rationale presented in Sect. II-B, we propose
WISERNet, the WIder SEparate-then-Reunion Network. The
conceptual architecture of WISERNet is illustrated in Fig. 1.
WISERNet takes a true-color image as input and applies
channel-wise convolution to the red, green, and blue bands of
the input image, respectively. Following the recipe of prior
works [20]–[28], [30], the weights of the kernels assigned
to each channel are initialized with high-pass filters in rich
models to increase SNR. Here the thirty filters used in SRM [8]
are used. Therefore each band is convolved with thirty 5 × 5
initialized kernels and thirty corresponding output channels
are generated. Please note that in the training procedure, we
set the weights in the bottom kernels learnable. The bottom
channel-wise convolutional layer corresponds to the “separate”
stage of our proposed network. The three separate groups
of output channels are then concatenated together to form a
ninety-channel input of the second convolutional layer.
Started from the second convolutional layer, the upper struc-
ture of our proposed network corresponds to the “reunion”
stage. It is a united wide and relatively shallow convolutional
neural network, which contains convolutional layers with
plenty of kernels. We fix the depth, namely the number of cas-
caded convolutional layers of the upper structure to three, and
explicitly increase the capacity of WISERNet by magnifying
the number of the kernels in each convolutional layer with a
model magnification factor n. With increasing n, WISERNet
becomes “wider” and “wider”. On top of the convolutional
layers there is a four-layer fully-connected (“dense”) neural
network which makes the final prediction. The successive
layers of the fully-connected network contain 800, 400, 200,
and 2 neurons, respectively.
The detailed configuration of WISERNet is shown in
Tab. III. Assume that the true-color image fed to WISERNet
is of size 512 × 512. From Tab. III we can see the output of
the bottom channel-wise convolutional layer, the “separate”
stage, is ninety channels of feature maps of size 512 × 512,
which act as the input of the “reunion” stage. In the “reunion”
stage, all of the normal convolutional layers are followed
by a BN (Batch Normalization) layer, a ReLU (Rectified
Linear Unit) layer, and an average pooling layer successively.
Specifically, the absolute values of the output of the first
normal convolutional layer are fed forward, following the
TABLE III
The detailed configuration of our proposed WISERNet.
Type Kernels size/stride(width×height×depth)/stride
Output size
(width×height×channel)
Channel-wise
convolution (5 × 5 × 30)/1 512 × 512 × 90
Convolution (5 × 5 × (8n))/2 256 × 256 × (8n)
ABS / ——
BN / ——
ReLU / ——
Average pooling (5 × 5 × 1)/2 128 × 128× (8n)
Convolution (3 × 3 × (32n))/1 128 × 128 × (32n)
BN / ——
ReLU / ——
Average pooling (5 × 5 × 1)/4 32 × 32 × (32n)
Convolution (3 × 3 × (128n))/1 32 × 32 × (128n)
BN / ——
ReLU / ——
Average pooling (32 × 32 × 1)/32 1 × 1 × (128n)
Flatten / 128n
Fully connection / 800
ReLU / ——
Fully connection / 400
ReLU / ——
Fully connection / 200
ReLU / ——
Fully connection / 2
Softmax / ——
recipe of prior works [25]–[28], [30]. The size of the output
feature maps of the normal convolutional layers from bottom
to top in this stage is 256 × 256, 128 × 128, and 32 × 32,
respectively. In order to roughly preserve the time complexity
per layer, the number of the kernels in each convolutional layer
is quadrupled accordingly. Consequently, the number of the
output feature maps is 8n, 32n, and 128n with the model
magnification factor n, respectively. Ahead of the top-most
normal convolutional layer, the output feature maps are pooled
with a large stride (step=32) and then flatten to a 128n-
D feature vector, which further acts as the input of the top
fully-connected network. In the top fully-connected network,
ReLU activation functions are used in all three hidden layers.
The final layer contains two neurons which denote “stego”
prediction and “cover” prediction. Softmax function is used
to output predicted probabilities.
III. Experiments
A. Experiment setup
As reported in prior works [11]–[15], different CFA demo-
saicking algorithms and different down-sampling algorithms
greatly affect detection performance of existing color image
steganalyzers. Therefore, all experiments in this paper are
conducted on different versions of BOSSBase (v1.01) [38].
Starting with the 10,000 full-resolution raw images, firstly
we followed the dataset generating process used in [11]. We
used ufraw to demosaick the raw images and then used Im-
ageMagick “convert” utility with the default “Lanczos” kernel
to down-sample (set the smaller image dimension to 512) and
central crop the resulting PPM color images to 512× 512. We
used two demosaicking algorithms in ufraw, PPG (Patterned
Pixel Grouping) and AHD (Adaptive Homogeneity Directed).
The corresponding datasets were named BOSS-PPG-LAN and
BOSS-AHD-LAN. Following the same process as above, with
7TABLE IV
Detection performance of CRM, SGRM, and GCRM on four different
datasets. In each sub-table, the best results for 0.2 bpc are underlined,
while the best results for 0.4 bpc are in framed boxes.
Datasets
Rich models
CRM SGRM GCRM
0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc
For HILL steganography
BOSS-PPG-LAN 0.6826 0.8061 0.68 0.8048 0.6743 0.8005
BOSS-PPG-CRP 0.9632 0.9952 0.9611 0.9947 0.9627 0.9954
BOSS-AHD-LAN 0.6817 0.8075 0.6813 0.8068 0.6775 0.8022
BOSS-AHD-CRP 0.9642 0.9942 0.9606 0.9957 0.9632 0.9951
For CMD-C-HILL steganography
BOSS-PPG-LAN 0.6325 0.7548 0.6333 0.7538 0.6265 0.748
BOSS-PPG-CRP 0.9337 0.9941 0.9329 0.9931 0.9324 0.9947
BOSS-AHD-LAN 0.6363 0.7558 0.6338 0.7528 0.6314 0.7477
BOSS-AHD-CRP 0.9357 0.9935 0.9317 0.9919 0.9331 0.9942
the down-sampling operation removed, we obtained another
two datasets, BOSS-PPG-CRP and BOSS-AHD-CRP. In order
to explore the impact of different down-sampling operations
on detection performance of color image steganalyzers, we re-
placed the “convert” utility with correspondent Matlab® script.
Pairing PPG, or AHD demosaicking algorithm with “Bicubic”,
or “Bilinear” kernel in Matlab® function imresize, we gen-
erated four more datasets, BOSS-PPG-BIC, BOSS-PPG-BIL,
BOSS-AHD-BIC and BOSS-AHD-BIL, respectively.
Four color image steganographic algorithms, HILL, SUNI-
WARD, CMD-C-HILL, and CMD-C-SUNIWARD were our
attacking targets in the experiments. 4 Their embedding pay-
loads were set to 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5 bpc, in which
we mainly focused on 0.2 bpc and 0.4 bpc. For HILL and
SUNIWARD, the same payload was embedded in every band.
In prior works, color image steganalyzers were evaluated
on different scenarios and datasets. In order to select the
most challenging scenarios and competitors of our proposed
WISERNet, we conducted a preliminary experiment in which
the detection performance of three state-of-the-art rich models
for color image steganalysis, CRM [11], GCRM [14], and
SGRM [15] were evaluated on four different datasets. As
shown in Tab. IV, different demosaicking algorithms (PPG
or AHD) had little effect on the performance of the three
rich models. The down-sampled datasets, e.g. BOSS-PPG-
LAN and BOSS-AHD-LAN, were the most challenging sce-
narios for rich models. When evaluated on down-sampled
datasets, the performance of CRM was always the best. The
performances of the three rich models on BOSS-PPG-CRP
and BOSS-AHD-CRP, the datasets without down-sampling,
were similar, and were all approaching to 100%. Therefore
for brevity, all the rest experiments reported in this paper were
only conducted on down-sampled datasets, and only CRM was
selected as the representative rich-model based competitor.
As for deep-learning steganalyzers, we selected Ye’s
model [25], and Xu’s model #2 [30] as the representative
competitors in the experiments. For Ye’s model, the bottom
4According to peer feedback, we have fixed a bug in the original imple-
mentation of CMD-C [7] and guarantee that different pseudo-random seeds
are assigned to each of the simulators corresponding to three color bands.
convolutional layer was equipped with channel-wise convolu-
tion with learnable weights. To be fair, its selection-channel-
aware version was not included in the experiments. For Xu’s
model #2, please note that it is designed for gray-scale JPEG
image steganalysis. Therefore in the experiments we adopted
an alternative version of Xu’s model #2 in which the bottom
convolutional layer were with 30 fixed SRM kernels and input
channel concatenation. For a detailed discussion regarding
to the configurations of the bottom convolutional layer of
the competing deep-learning steganalyzers, please refer to
Sect. III-C.
Our implementation of WISERNet was based on Caffe
toolbox [39]. Unless otherwise specified, the model magni-
fication factor of WISERNet was fixed to n = 9. It was
trained using mini-batch stochastic gradient descent with “inv”
learning rate starting from 0.001 (power: 0.75; gamma: 0.0001;
weight decay: 0.0005) and a momentum fixed to 0.9. The
batch size in the training procedure was 16 and the maximum
number of iterations was set to 30×104. The source codes and
auxiliary materials are available for download from GitHub 5.
We used the same batch size and maximum number of
iterations in the training procedure of Ye’s model and Xu’s
model #2. The settings of all other hyper-parameters for those
two deep-learning based competitors followed what reported
in the original papers [25], [30]. In every experiment, 6,000
cover-stego pairs were randomly selected for training. The
remaining 4,000 cover-stego pairs were for testing. All ex-
periments were repeated ten times, and the mean of predictive
accuracies on testing set over ten repetitions were reported.
The experiments involved two types of steganalyzers, the rich-
model based and the deep-learning based. For those rich-model
based steganalyzers, FLD ensemble classifier with default set-
tings [10] was utilized. For those deep-learning steganalyzers,
include our proposed WISERNet, 1,000 cover-stego pairs were
further randomly picked out from training set for validation.
In each experiment, the model was validated and saved every
1 × 104 iterations. The one with the best validation accuracy
was evaluated on the corresponding testing set. 6
B. Comparison to state of the art
Firstly, we report the results of the experiments conducted
on BOSS-PPG-LAN and BOSS-AHD-LAN. From Fig. 2 we
can see different demosaicking algorithms (PPG or AHD) had
little impact on the performance of color image steganalyzers.
All of the three deep-learning based models could obtain
significant performance improvement compared with CRM,
the rich-model based steganalyzer. As for the three deep-
learning steganalyzers themselves, the performance of Xu’s
model #2 (with 30 fixed SRM kernels) was always better
than that of Ye’s model, which is reasonable since compared
with Ye’s model, Xu’s model #2 is much deeper and more
complicated. However, our proposed WISERNet performed
even better than Xu’s model #2 although it is a relatively
shallow and small model.
5https://github.com/tansq/WISERNet
6All of the deep-learning steganalyzers were trained and tested on a GPU
cluster with 80 NVIDIA® Tesla® P100 GPU cards. The rich-model based
steganalyzers were trained and tested on a CPU cluster with 200 cores.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of testing accuracy of our proposed WISERNet with state-of-the-art steganalyzers in the literature. (a) and (e) are the results for CMD-
C-HILL; (b) and (f) are for CMD-C-SUNIWARD; (c) and (g) are the results for HILL; (d) and (h) are for SUNIWARD. The experiments for (a), (b), (c) and
(d) were conducted on BOSS-PPG-LAN, while those for (e), (f), (g) and (h) were conducted on BOSS-AHD-LAN.
From the perspective of color image steganography, it is no
doubt that CMD-C better resisted color image steganalysis.
However, the superiority of WISERNet was also more obvious
when used to attack CMD-C steganography. For CMD-C-
HILL with 0.4 bpc on BOSS-AHD-LAN dataset, WISERNet
could further increase detection accuracy by as large as 4% on
the basis of Xu’s model #2 (with 30 fixed SRM kernels). The
more obvious performance improvement for CMD-C implies
9TABLE V
Full comparison of testing accuracy of our proposed WISERNet with state-of-the-art steganalyzers in the literature. CMD-C-HILL stego images with 0.2
bpc and 0.4 bpc were included. The results on BOSS-PPG-BIC, BOSS-PPG-BIL, BOSS-AHD-BIC and BOSS-AHD-BIL are given. The results on
BOSS-PPG-LAN are also listed here for reference. The best results for 0.2 bpc are underlined, while the best results for 0.4 bpc are in framed boxes.
Datasets
CRM
Ye’s model Xu’s model #2 (with 30 fixed SRM kernels)
Our proposed
Channel-wise
convolution
Normal
convolution
Input
concatenation
Channel-wise
convolution
Normal
convolution
Input
concatenation
0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc
BOSS-PPG-LAN 0.6325 0.7548 0.6567 0.7965 0.6474 0.7568 0.6187 0.7169 0.6962 0.7941 0.6562 0.7763 0.7083 0.8167 0.7139 0.8361
BOSS-PPG-BIC 0.6551 0.7802 0.6741 0.8069 0.6589 0.7732 0.6332 0.7335 0.7124 0.8068 0.6611 0.7895 0.7294 0.8289 0.7318 0.8435
BOSS-PPG-BIL 0.7556 0.8717 0.7859 0.9019 0.7611 0.8721 0.7445 0.8343 0.7872 0.9045 0.7487 0.863 0.7904 0.9093 0.8033 0.9169
BOSS-AHD-BIC 0.6597 0.7832 0.6711 0.7991 0.6614 0.7728 0.6374 0.7355 0.7105 0.8141 0.6627 0.7922 0.7276 0.8198 0.7369 0.8448
BOSS-AHD-BIL 0.7578 0.8728 0.7804 0.9019 0.7622 0.8738 0.7376 0.837 0.7857 0.9067 0.7647 0.8593 0.7933 0.9061 0.8022 0.9144
TABLE VI
Comparison of testing accuracy of our proposed WISERNet with state-of-the-art steganalyzers in the literature under the scenario of mixed datasets.
CMD-C-HILL stego images with 0.2 bpc and 0.4 bpc were included. The best results for 0.2 bpc are underlined, while the best results for 0.4 bpc are in
framed boxes. Abbreviations enclosed in braces indicates different involved datasets. For instance, BOSS-PPG-
{
LAN, BIL, BIC
}
indicates that the mixed
dataset is composed of BOSS-PPG-LAN, BOSS-PPG-BIL, and BOSS-PPG-BIC.
Mixture of datasets
CRM Ye’s model
(with channel-wise convolution)
Xu’s model #2
(with 30 fixed SRM kernels,
and input concatenation)
Our proposed
0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc 0.2 bpc 0.4 bpc
BOSS-PPG-
{
LAN, BIL, BIC
}
0.6951 0.8136 0.7417 0.8379 0.7566 0.8497 0.7658 0.8674
BOSS-AHD-
{
LAN, BIL, BIC
}
0.6973 0.8193 0.7422 0.8402 0.7517 0.8516 0.7649 0.8737
BOSS-
{
PPG, AHD
}
-LAN 0.668 0.7878 0.6844 0.8031 0.7055 0.8118 0.725 0.8411
Mixture of all six datasets 0.6926 0.8101 0.7388 0.8401 0.7586 0.8516 0.7633 0.8622
TABLE VII
Comparison of number of parameters and computational complexity for our proposed WISERNet and other state-of-the-art deep-learning based
steganalyzers. The computational complexity is measured in terms of FLOPs (floating-point operations).
Our proposed WISERNet
Xu’s model #2
11-layer version
(with 30 fixed SRM kernels,
and input concatenation)
Ye’s model
(with channel-wise convolution)
Xu’s model #2
(with 30 fixed SRM kernels,
and input concatenation)
Parameters 2.12 × 106 2.66 × 106 1.07 × 106 4.87 × 106
FLOPs 4.11 × 109 1.08 × 1010 5.76 × 109 1.68 × 1010
that compared with Xu’s model #2, the specific shallow-
and-wide, separate-then-reunion structure of WISERNet can
better utilize the intrinsic statistical characteristics among color
bands to attack CMD-C.
For the sake of completeness, for CMD-C-HILL, we give
a full comparison of testing accuracy of our proposed WIS-
ERNet with CRM, Ye’s model and Xu’s model #2 in Tab. V.
The results for two representative payloads, 0.2 bpc and 0.4
bpc are given. The impacts of another two down-sampling
algorithms, “Bicubic”, and “Bilinear” are inspected. Therefore
the results on BOSS-PPG-BIC, BOSS-PPG-BIL, BOSS-AHD-
BIC and BOSS-AHD-BIL are listed. From Tab. V we can
see different down-sampling algorithms had huge impact on
detection performance of the steganalyzers. The steganalyzers
always achieved better performances on the images generated
with “Bilinear” down-sampling algorithms. For Ye’s model,
channel-wise convolution in the bottom convolutional layer
was always the best choice. However for Xu’s model #2, with
input band concatenation was the best choice. Although detec-
tion performance of WISERNet was also affected by different
down-sampling algorithms, in all scenarios it performed the
best and possessed a clear margin of superiority.
In Tab. VI, we also give a comparison of testing accuracy
of the four steganalyzers under the scenario of mixed datasets
for CMD-C-HILL. In each experiment, we used the same
pseudo-random number series to split every involved dataset
into training set, validation set (for deep-learning steganalyz-
ers), and testing set. The corresponding subsets were merged
together to form the mixed training set, validation set and
testing set, respectively. Therefore we guaranteed that all the
cover-stego pairs generated from the same raw image can
only be included in one of the mixed subsets, e.g. in the
training set. Firstly we fixed the demosaicking algorithm, and
mixed the datasets with three different down-sampling options,
namely with “Lanczos” kernel of ImageMagick, “Bicubic”
and “Bilinear” kernels of Matlab®. Then we fixed the down-
sampling option to “Lanczos” and mixed the datasets with
PPG and AHD demosaicking algorithms. Finally we mixed
the datasets with two demosaick options and three down-
sampling options. From Tab. VI we can see the effects of
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different demosaicking options and down-sampling options on
detection performance of the investigated steganalyzers are
similar. But it is amazing that in all of those scenarios our
proposed WISERNet always performed the best.
The above experimental results indicates that our proposed
WISERNet is with superior performance especially when used
to attack CMD-C, the latest steganographic algorithm pur-
posely for color images. The superiority of WISERNet is ob-
vious even compared with the most advanced and complicated
deep-learning steganalyzer, namely Xu’s model #2. Please
note that the detection performance gain is not achieved with
deeper, larger or more complicated deep-learning structure.
As shown in Tab. VII, WISERNet is only with less than
half parameters and about a quarter computational complexity
compared with Xu’s model #2 (with fixed 30 SRM kernels),
the second best performing deep-learning steganalyzer after
WISERNet. If we would like to make a fairer comparison, the
11-layer version of Xu’s model #2 is a suitable rival, which
was also investigated in [30]. The 11-layer version of Xu’s
model #2 possesses slightly more parameters and more than
double computational complexity compared with our proposed
WISERNet. But as shown in Tab. VIII, the superiority of
WISERNet is obvious. For instance, when the payload of the
target CMD-C is 0.4bpc, WISERNet can surpass the 11-layer
version of Xu’s model #2 by more than four percent.
C. Impact of different components for WISERNet and its deep-
learning based competitors
In Tab. IX we further compare the impact of different
configurations of the bottom convolutional layer on detection
performances of our proposed WISERNet, and another two
deep-learning based competitors. From Tab. IX we can see
for our proposed WISERNet, channel-wise convolution with
learnable weights always achieved the best performance. The
results also show that channel-wise convolution with learnable
weights was more suitable for Ye’s model. Besides, we can
clearly observe that with cross-band interleave pre-processing
strategy, all deep-learning based steganalyzers suffer severe
performance degradation.
Xu’s model #2 is the deepest and the most advanced deep-
learning steganalyzer among the competitors. However it is
designed for gray-scale JPEG image steganalysis, and the 16
4 × 4 DCT high-pass filters in the bottom convolutional layer
adopted in its original version might not suitable for spatial-
domain color image steganalysis. Tab. IX clearly shows that
the alternative version of Xu’s model #2 (in which the 16
DCT filters are replaced with 30 SRM kernels) performed
better than the original version. It is noteworthy that with fixed
kernel weights, input band concatenation before the bottom
convolutional layer is the best option for Xu’s model #2. It
may be attributed to the very deep structure of Xu’s model #2,
which makes the convolution kernels in the top layers finally
have the opportunity to perceive the cross-band correlation in
pixels.
Tab. X shows the impact of different model magnification
factor n on our proposed WISERNet. As shown in Tab. X,
starting from n = 1, detection performance was steadily
promoted along with increasing n, and reached its maximum
with n = 9. Therefore, n was fixed to 9 in our experiments.
D. Imapct of learnable bottom kernels
Firstly, we try to give an explanation why making the
weights of the bottom convolution kernels of WISERNet
learnable can further improve detection performance.
We agree with the opinion that the main purpose of the
convolutions in the bottom convolutional layer is to suppress
image contents and retain stego noises at the same time [20],
[21], [24], [25]. However, as pointed out in [27], optimization
of the bottom convolution kernels in favor of the extraction
of stego noises is hard to achieve with gradient-descent based
learning. In fact, as mentioned in Sect. II-A, fixed high-pass
filters in the bottom convolutional layer of most existing deep-
learning steganalyzers also provide evidences to support our
argument.
Since the proposal of rich models [8], it is well accepted that
model diversity is crucial to the performance of steganalyzers.
Therefore we believe the performance improvement of WIS-
ERNet can be attributed to the further model diversity brought
by continuous learning and optimizing of the kernels in the
bottom convolutional layer of WISERNet, although learnable
bottom kernels cannot help boost SNR. Refer to Sect. II-B,
the bottom convolution kernels of WISERNet can be divided
into triples
{
W11k,W
1
2k,W
1
3k
}
, 1 ≤ k ≤ 30. Denote the average
of pair-wise correlation between weights in the triples as:
CW =
∑30
k=1
∑
1≤i< j≤3 Corr(W1ik,W
1
jk)
90
(14)
CW can be used to measure the diversity of the bottom
kernels. Initially, we set W11k = W
1
2k = W
1
3k = W˜k, where
W˜k is one of the SRM high-pass filters. Therefore initially
CW = 1, and it decreases along with increasing diversity of
the bottom kernels. In Tab. XI, we give a demonstration. In one
training procedure of our proposed WISERNet which aimed at
attacking CMD-C-HILL stego images with 0.4 bpc, we could
clearly inspect CW steadily decreased with increasing training
iterations, which indicates diversity of the bottom kernels
increased along with increasing training iterations. CW reached
its minimum at around 20 × 104 iterations. It is interesting
that WISERNet also achieved its best validation accuracy at
20 × 104 iterations, which implies that the performance of
WISERNet was relevant with diversity of the bottom kernels.
However, please note that initialized with high-pass filters,
the bottom kernels of WISERNet eventually cannot exhibit
large diversity even with enormous iterations. In our exten-
sive experiments, we have never observed CW was reduced
to below 0.9 even after 100 × 104 iterations. At last, one
more remarkable thing is that Xu’s model #2, the one with
much deeper structure could not gain better performance with
learnable bottom kernels. Therefore we believe that the wide
and shallow structure of WISERNet might be the determining
factor of beneficial learnable bottom convolution kernels.
As mentioned in Sect. II-B, our basic assumption is that
E(C1 ∗W11k) ≈ E(C2 ∗W12k) ≈ E(C3 ∗W13k). One interesting
question arises: Is this assumption still holds with more and
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TABLE VIII
Comparison of testing accuracy of our proposed WISERNet with the 11-layer version of Xu’s model #2 (with 30 fixed SRM kernels). The experiments were
conducted on BOSS-PPG-LAN. The terms in parentheses with preceding ↑ denote accuracy increment of our proposed WISERNet compared to the 11-layer
version of Xu’s model #2.
Steganalyzers Payload (bpc)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Our proposed WISERNet 0.6329 (↑0.0321) 0.7139 (↑0.0364) 0.7767 (↑0.0376) 0.8361 (↑0.0412) 0.8748 (↑0.0433)
11-layer version of
Xu’s model #2 0.6008 0.6775 0.7391 0.7949 0.8315
TABLE IX
Impact of different configurations of the bottom convolutional layer. The experiments were conducted on BOSS-PPG-LAN. Only CMD-C-HILL stego
images with 0.4 bpc were included. The best result in every column is underlined. The underline in bold highlights the best result among them.
How to
convolve Learnable
Our
proposed
network
Compared deep-learning steganalyzers
Ye’s
model
Xu’s model #2
with 16
DCT kernels
Xu’s model #2
with 30
SRM kernels
Channel-wise
convolution
3 0.8361 0.7965 0.7244 0.7941
7 0.8232 0.7895 0.7269 0.7951
Normal
convolution
3 0.7268 0.7608 0.6916 0.7725
7 0.7257 0.7566 0.7085 0.7763
Input
concatenation
3 0.7259 0.7319 0.7672 0.7987
7 0.7270 0.7268 0.7916 0.8167
Cross-band
interleave
3 0.7063 0.6935 0.7051 0.7122
7 0.6968 0.6848 0.6936 0.7041
TABLE X
Impact of different model magnification factor n. The experiments were conducted on BOSS-PPG-LAN. Only CMD-C-HILL stego images with 0.4 bpc were
included. The best result is in framed box.
Model magnification factor n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.7375 0.8037 0.8208 0.8214 0.8227 0.8262 0.8313 0.8319 0.8361 0.8321
TABLE XI
CW ,
˚|S |C and ˚|S |S versus increasing iterations of our proposed WISERNet. The experiment was conducted on BOSS-PPG-LAN. CMD-C-HILL stego images
with 0.4 bpc were included.
Iterations CW
˚|S |C ˚|S |S Iterations CW ˚|S |C ˚|S |S
0 × 104 1 0.9888 0.9888 6 × 104 0.9877 0.9886 0.9886
1 × 104 0.9985 0.9888 0.9888 10 × 104 0.9876 0.9884 0.9884
2 × 104 0.9978 0.9886 0.9886 15 × 104 0.9814 0.9881 0.9881
3 × 104 0.9978 0.9886 0.9886 20 × 104 0.9753 0.9889 0.9889
4 × 104 0.9975 0.9890 0.9890 25 × 104 0.9795 0.9886 0.9886
5 × 104 0.9967 0.9891 0.9891 30 × 104 0.9848 0.9887 0.9887
more diverse bottom kernels? For a given image, denote E(Ci∗
W1ik) = µik, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Let µk = (µ1k, µ2k, µ3k), 1 = (1, 1, 1), and
θk be the angle between vector µk and vector 1. The cosine
similarity [40] between µk and 1 is defined as:
S k = cos(θk) =
µ1k + µ2k + µ3k√
3 ·
√
µ21k + µ
2
2k + µ
2
3k
(15)
However, since W1ik, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 are high-pass filters, µik, 1 ≤
i ≤ 3 may be less than zero. As a result, S k ranges from −1 to
1. For simplicity we use |S k | to measure the similarity among
µik, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. The more similar µik, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 are, the more
parallel µk and 1 tend to be , the more |S k | is close to 1.
Fed with one image, let |S | denote the average of |S k |, 1 ≤
k ≤ 30. In Tab. XI, we also analyzed the 1,000 cover-stego
pairs in the validation set of BOSS-PPG-LAN. Denote the
average of |S | of the 1,000 cover images as ˚|S |C , and that
of the 1,000 stego images as ˚|S |S . From Tab. XI we can see
˚|S |C was always equal to ˚|S |S which means that the impact of
stego noises was negligible. Though CW slowly but steadily
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decreased with increasing training iterations, both ˚|S |C and
˚|S |S kept close to 1. Therefore the experimental evidence
indicated that for our proposed WISERNet, the means of the
corresponding output channels are still nearly equivalent even
with more and more diverse bottom kernels during the training
procedure. As a result, our basic assumption in Sect. II-B
holds.
E. Impact of the correlations among color bands of the targets
Our major target, CMD-C is a non-additive embedding
distortion minimizing framework which can preserve not only
the correlation within each color band, but also the correlations
among three color bands. It is interesting to observe how
the correlations among color bands of CMD-C stego images
affect the performance of our proposed WISERNet. We can
disable the inter-band correlations in CMD-C stego images via
removing elements from other bands in the calculation of the
costs [7]. As shown in Tab. XII, when the target is the alterna-
tive version of CMD-C in which the correlation among three
color bands is disabled, our proposed WISERNet achieves
better performance. Furthermore, the gap between Xu’s model
#2 and WISERNet is wider than when the target is the original
CMD–HILL. The wider gap implies that inter-band correlation
of stego noises introduced by original CMD-C (even weak)
do help it better resist the channel-wise convolution in the
bottom “Separate” stage of WISERNet. Our proposed wide-
and-shallow, separate-then-reunion network structure shows
even greater advantage when used to attack CMD-C without
the correlation among three color bands.
F. Performance on large-scale dataset under cover-source
mismatching scenarios
We collected another 100,000 diverse raw images and
followed the dataset generating process as mentioned in
Sect. III-A (with PPG demosaicking algorithm and “Lanczos”
down-sampling kernel) to construct a new dataset SZUBASE-
PPG-LAN. Fig. 3 is devoted to the comparison of perfor-
mance of our proposed WISERNet with other state-of-the-
art steganalyzers on SZUBASE-PPG-LAN, under cover-source
mismatching scenarios. From Fig. 3 we can see that the
impact of varing demosaicking algorithms is moderate, while
the impact of varing down-sampling kernels is more obvious.
However, under such cover-source mismatching scenarios, the
impacts on the steganalyzers, either hand-crafted or deep-
learning based (including our proposed WISERNet), are sim-
ilar. Our proposed WISERNet is still the one with the best
performance.
IV. Concluding remarks
Along with the arise of steganographic algorithms purposely
for color spatial images, the corresponding requirement for
powerful color image steganalysis becomes more compelling.
In this paper we propose WISERNet, the wider separate-then-
reunion network for steganalysis of color images. The major
contributions of this work are as follows:
• We have provided theoretical rationale to claim that
the summation in normal convolution actually impairs
the signal-to-noise ratio, which collides with the main
purpose of the bottom convolutional layer.
• We have pointed out that the summation in normal con-
volution is a “linear collusion attack” which is a double-
edged sword for color image steganalysis. Accordingly
we have proposed WISERNet, the wider separate-then-
reunion network for steganalysis of color images.
• We have conducted extensive experiments on image
datasets with different demosaicking and down-sampling
opinions. The experimental results demonstrated the su-
periority of our proposed WISERNet.
Our future work will focus on two aspects: (1) making
WISERNet capable of identifying suspicious images under
more complex cover source mismatching scenarios; (2) further
developing deep-learning architectures suitable for large-scale
JPEG color image steganalysis on the basis of WISERNet.
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